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Abstract
In recent years, security solutions have increasingly focused on
actively predicting future attacks. Since prediction accuracy can
improve with more information about the attackers, sharing security-
relevant data among organizations is often being advocated. How-
ever, collaborative security approaches are rarely implemented due
to related trust, privacy, and liability concerns.
In this paper, we explore a novel approach to collaborative threat
mitigation where organizations estimate the benefits of data sharing
with potential partners in a privacy-preserving way (i.e., without
actually disclosing their dataset). Data sharing then occurs securely
within coalitions of allied organizations. We focus on collabora-
tive predictive blacklisting, i.e., predicting sources of future attacks
based on both one’s own data and that of a few selected partners.
We study how different collaboration strategies affect prediction
accuracy by experimenting on a real-world dataset of 2 billion IP
addresses and observe up to a 105% improvement.
1. INTRODUCTION
Modern security solutions aim beyond passive defense and at-
tempt to actively predict attacks by learning from offensive prac-
tices. Previous research has shown that their accuracy improves if
organizations share data with each other, as attackers tend to target
victims in similar ways [27, 44, 52]. Thus, collaboration among
victims is often being advocated. Despite clear advantages, orga-
nizations are reluctant to share security-relevant data due to related
trust, privacy, and liability concerns. Corporate data such as fire-
wall logs might expose confidential information, challenge a cor-
poration’s competitiveness, or reveal negligence.
To address these issues, previous work proposed to sanitize data
prior to sharing [1, 31, 37, 43, 49], e.g., via generalization and
suppression. However, this makes data less useful [30], and still
prone to de-anonymization [8]. Other work suggested reporting
encrypted data to a semi-trusted central repository that obliviously
aggregates contributions [3], or relying on distributed data aggrega-
tion protocols based on secure multi-party computation and secret
sharing [6]. While aggregation can help detect malicious activities
or compute traffic statistics, it operates akin to large alert reposi-
tories as it identifies most prolific attack sources and yields global
models. As shown in [44, 52], however, generic attack models are
not desirable as they miss a significant number of attacks, espe-
cially when attack sources choose targets strategically and focus on
a few known vulnerable networks.
In theory, organizations could provide encrypted data to a cen-
tral authority that obliviously computes personalized recommenda-
tions for threat mitigation using Fully Homomorphic Encryption
(FHE) [18]. However, FHE is still far from being practical and
it remains unclear whether complex machine learning algorithms
needed for the prediction could run effectively over encrypted data
and reveal personalized results to data owners only.
Intuition. We propose an alternative approach to collaborative
threat mitigation where organizations are able to find suitable col-
laboration partners in a distributed and privacy-preserving way, and
organize into coalitions prior to data sharing. This way, data shar-
ing takes place within groups of related victims that partner up with
relevant sources of information and obtain data that improves their
predictions. In our envisioned model, parties first identify a set of
potential partners from a larger pool of organizations, e.g., corpo-
rations in the same sector, and then select the best partners within
the corresponding set. In practice, this can be repeated over time to
ensure relevant and near real-time protection.
To demonstrate the feasibility of this approach, we experiment
with a framework called Sharing is Caring (SIC), which supports
two types of algorithms: one for estimating the benefits of sharing
data with a potential partner in a privacy-preserving way (i.e., with-
out disclosing plaintext data), and the other for sharing agreed-upon
datasets with selected partners, e.g., only common attacks.
We focus on collaborative predictive blacklisting, namely pre-
dicting attack sources based on logs generated by firewalls and/or
intrusion detection systems (see Sec. 2.3). Collaboration can im-
prove accuracy since organizations rely not only on their own logs,
but also on data from selected partners, which SIC helps identify in
a privacy-friendly way. Privacy is provably guaranteed, as benefit
estimation and information sharing occur via secure computation.
Experiments. One of our main goals is to investigate which collab-
oration strategies work best, in terms of the resulting improvement
in prediction accuracy. To this end, we conduct several experiments
on a real-world dataset of 2 billion suspicious IP addresses col-
lected by DShield.org [42] over 2 months (see Sec. 4). This dataset
contains a large variety of contributors, as confirmed in our analy-
sis, which allows us to test the effectiveness of data sharing among
diverse groups of victims.
We perform a quantitative analysis on this dataset in order to
identify victims’ and attackers’ profiles, among other features. This
helps us clean the dataset and design a meaningful data sharing ex-
periment. We repeatedly select 100 victims at random from regular
contributors and measure the efficacy of our techniques in a sce-
nario where collaboration occurs within small coalitions. The ex-
periment setting models a scenario where a highly diverse commu-
nity of contributors attempts to form coalitions. We then test mul-
tiple collaboration strategies using a standard prediction algorithm
based on Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) [44].
Main Results. Our analysis yields several key findings in the scope
of private collaboration for threat mitigation. Specifically, we ob-
serve that: (1) the more information is available about attackers, the
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better the prediction, as intuitively expected; (2) different collab-
oration strategies yield a large spectrum of performances, in fact,
with some strategies, sharing does not actually help much; (3) shar-
ing information only about common attackers is almost as useful as
sharing everything. This highlights both the importance of select-
ing the right partners and the usefulness of limited data sharing.
Contributions. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first
to provide a privacy-friendly solution for collaborative predictive
blacklisting. We demonstrate that data sharing does not have to be
an “all-or-nothing” process: by relying on efficient cryptographic
protocols for privacy-preserving information sharing, it is possible
to only share relevant data, and only when beneficial. Compared
to prior work, our approach has several important advantages: (1)
it helps (privately) identify entities with good partnership potential,
(2) it minimizes information disclosure, and (3) it increases speed
of malicious activity detection, leading to near real-time mitigation.
Our work could also be applied to other security-related appli-
cations that benefit from data sharing, such as spam filtering [11],
virus detection [21], or DDoS mitigation [36].
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 System Model
We assume a network of entities V = {Vi}ni=1, with each Vi
maintaining a dataset Si of suspicious events, such as suspicious
IP addresses observed by a firewall 〈IP, time, port〉. We denote this
list of events as Li (for each entity Vi). Hence, Si = {Li}. Each
entity Vi aims to predict and block (i.e., blacklist) future attacks.
Existing Approaches. Thus far, two main approaches have been
used for predictive blacklisting: (1) no collaboration, i.e., each en-
tity Vi independently performs the prediction based only its own
dataset Si, or (2) community-based, i.e., each entity Vi ∈ V sub-
mits its dataset Si to a central repository, which returns a cus-
tomized blacklist for Vi, also based on every entity’s dataset. The
latter provides increased accuracy [52, 44] but requires entities to
reveal their entire datasets to a central repository.
Our Novel Model. We introduce a privacy-friendly collaborative
model for predictive blacklisting, whereby entities identify good
collaboration partners via pairwise secure computations (without
the need for a trusted third-party), and then share data. This way,
data sharing takes place in groups of related victims. Each entity
performs predictions based not only on its own dataset but also on
an augmented dataset that comprises information possibly shared
by the counterpart. This peer-to-peer model seeks to combine the
best of the two aforementioned models: improved prediction and
no wholesale disclosure of datasets. To this end, we rely on ef-
ficient cryptographic protocols for privacy-preserving information
sharing, presented below.
Threat Model. We denote with A ∈ V an adversary attempting
to learn information about other entities’ datasets. (External adver-
saries are not considered, since their actions can be mitigated via
standard network security techniques.) In the worst case, A may
try to collaborate with all other entities and collect available infor-
mation after each data sharing attempt. A obtains network traces
that allow inference of strategic information. Hence, we aim to
protect data confidentiality for each Vi ∈ V . We assume adversary
A to be semi-honest (or honest-but-curious): A follows protocols’
specifications and does not misrepresent any of its inputs. How-
ever, during or after protocol execution, A might attempt to infer
additional information about other parties’ inputs.
2.2 Privacy-preserving Information Sharing
We now review a few cryptographic primitives used throughout
the rest of the paper.
Secure Two-Party Computation (2PC) allows two parties, on in-
put x and y, respectively, to privately compute the output of a pub-
lic function f over (x, y). Both parties learn nothing beyond what
can be inferred from the output of the function. For more details on
2PC, and implementations thereof, we refer to [50, 19, 24].
Private Set Intersection (PSI) involves two parties, a server, on in-
put a set S, and a client, on input a set C. At the end of the interac-
tion, the latter only learns S∩C, whereas the former learns nothing
beyond client’s set size. State-of-the-art instantiations, with dif-
ferent complexities and computational assumptions, include both
garbled-circuit based techniques [23, 16] and specialized proto-
cols [17, 29, 14, 26, 15]. In our experiments, we use the PSI
construction presented in [14], secure under the One-More-RSA
assumption [4] in the Random Oracle Model (ROM), with compu-
tational and communication complexities linear in set sizes. Note,
however, that one can select any PSI construction, without affecting
our design.
Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-CA) involves two par-
ties, a server, on input a set S, and a client, on input a set C. At
the end of the interaction, the latter only learns |S ∩ C|, and the
server learns nothing beyond client’s set size. PSI-CA is a more
“stringent” variant than PSI, as it only reveals the magnitude of the
intersection, but not the actual contents. There are several instantia-
tions of PSI-CA [17, 2, 22, 13], and, in our experiments, we use the
construction presented in [13], which has linear complexities, with
security under the One-More-DH assumption [4] in the Random
Oracle Model (ROM). Again, note that any PSI-CA construction
can be employed.
Private Jaccard Similarity (PJS) involves two parties, a server, on
input a set S, and a client, on input a set C. At the end of the inter-
action, the client only learns J(S,C) = (|S∩C|)/(|S∪C|), where
J(C, S) denotes the Jaccard Similarity index [25] between sets S
and C. Blundo et al. [5] slightly relax the above definition and
shows how to privately compute the Jaccard Similarity index using
only PSI-CA. Since J(S,C) = (|S∩C|)/(|S|+|C|−|S∩C|), par-
ties can obtain J(S,C) without disclosing actual set contents, but
only the intersection cardinality, which, however, reveals slightly
more information than only the intersection/union ratio.
2.3 Predictive Blacklisting
Prediction algorithms rely on past data to decide on likely future
events. In this paper, we focus on collaborative predictive blacklist-
ing [52]. The goal is to forecast future potential malicious sources
based on past attacks. For instance, each organization predicts the
likelihood of future attacks from particular IP addresses.
Algorithm. Let t denote the day an attack was reported and T the
current time, so t = 1, 2, ..., T . We partition T into two windows
of consecutive days: a training window, Ttrain and a testing window,
Ttest. Prediction algorithms rely on information in the training data,
t ∈ Ttrain, to tune their model and validate the predictions for the
testing data, t ∈ Ttest.
The Global Worst Offender List (GWOL) is a basic prediction
algorithm that selects top attack sources from Ttrain, i.e., highest
number of globally reported attacks [52]. Local Worst Offender
List (LWOL) is the local version of GWOL and operates on a local
network based entirely on its own history [52]. These approaches
encounter some limitations as LWOL fails to predict on attackers
not previously seen, while GWOL tends to be irrelevant to small
victims. Thus, machine learning algorithms were suggested to im-
prove GWOL and LWOL [44, 52].
We use the Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA)
algorithm, as proposed by Soldo et al. [44] to perform blacklisting
prediction. EWMA uses time series aggregation: it consists in ag-
gregating attack events from Ttrain to predict future attacks. Other
features one could consider include the historical malicious activity
of an IP address, the clustering of IP addresses with similar mali-
cious behavior, and the network centrality of a target. Observe that
it is out of the scope of this paper to improve on existing prediction
algorithms. Instead, we focus on how to help organizations iden-
tify useful partners in a privacy-preserving way, and how different
collaboration strategies perform in comparison to each other.
Accuracy Metrics. As commonly done with prediction algorithms,
we measure accuracy with True Positives (TP), which is the number
of predictions that correctly match future events. In the blacklist-
ing scenario, TP correspond to the number of attacks in the blacklist
that are correctly predicted.
In practice, sources might not be blacklisted at once and black-
listing algorithms might rely on several observations over time be-
fore blacklisting a source, such as the rate at which the source is
attacking, the payload of suspicious packets, etc. It is important to
distinguish between the prediction algorithm, which identifies po-
tential malicious sources and/or creates a watch-list from the black-
listing algorithm, which actually blocks sources. Blacklisting algo-
rithms are site-specific and need to optimize, among others, false
negative and false positive ratios. The prediction algorithm enables
the identification of suspicious IP addresses that deserve further
scrutiny and improve the effectiveness of blacklisting algorithms.
Therefore, just like prior work [44, 52], we focus on measuring
the TP of the prediction algorithm, i.e., the ability to identify po-
tential sources of attacks, and do not consider false positives as it is
out of the scope of our work.
Upper Bounds. A future attack can be predicted if it already ap-
peared in the logs of some victims. Traditional upper-bounds on
collaboration algorithms capture this and we use them to evaluate
the performance of our collaboration algorithms. The Global Up-
per Bound GUB(Vi) measures, for every target Vi, the number
of attackers that are both in the training window of any victim and
in Vi’s testing window. For every Vi, we define the Local Upper
Bound LUB(Vi), as the number of attackers that are both in Vi’s
training and testing windows. Note that one could also predict at-
tackers that have never been reported before (e.g., when an entire
IP subnet is compromised), but this is out of the scope of this paper.
3. THE SIC FRAMEWORK
3.1 Overview
We describe the logic of the Sharing Is Caring (SIC) framework
in two steps, presenting algorithms supporting the secure selection
of collaboration partners, and algorithms for the privacy-preserving
merging of (i.e., sharing) datasets among partners. As discussed in
Sec. 2, we assume a network of {Vi}ni=1 entities. We define Si to
be the set of unique IP addresses held by Vi: Si = {IP ∈ Li}.
A high-level sketch of the SIC framework is presented in Fig. 1.
In (1), potential partner entities Vi and Vj estimate the benefits
they would receive from sharing their security data with each other.
They could do so by securely computing one or multiple metrics.
In (2), based on the estimated benefits, entities decide whether to
partner or not. For instance, Vi and Vj become partners if the ex-
pected benefit is above a certain threshold; alternatively, each entity
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Figure 1: Illustration of two entities operating in the SIC framework. (1)
Entity Vi starts interacting with entity Vj and they jointly and privately
estimate the benefits of collaboration; (2) Entities decide whether or not to
partner; (3) Partners decide how to merge their datasets.
might partner with k other entities that yield the maximum benefits.
Finally, in (3), partners merge their datasets, e.g., by only sharing
common attacks and nothing else.
3.2 Select
Entities select collaboration partners by evaluating, in pairwise
interactions, the potential benefits of sharing their data with each
other. That is, potential benefits decide partnerships. This is done in
a privacy-preserving way, as only a measure of anticipated benefits
is revealed and nothing about datasets’ content.
Supported Metrics. We consider several similarity metrics for
partner selection. Metrics are reported in Table 1, along with the
corresponding protocols for their privacy-preserving computation.
We consider similarity metrics as previous work [27, 52] showed
that collaborating with correlated victims works well. Victims are
correlated if they are targeted by correlated attacks, i.e., attacks
mounted by the same source IP against different networks around
the same time. Intuitively, correlation arises from attack trends; in
particular, correlated victim sites may be on a single hit list or might
be natural targets of a particular exploit (e.g., PHP vulnerability).
Then, collaboration helps re-enforce knowledge about an on-going
attack and/or learn about an attack before it hits.
Set-based and Correlation-based Similarity. We consider two
set-based metrics: Intersection-Size and Jaccard, which measure
set similarity and operate on unordered sets. We also consider Pear-
son and Cosine, which provide a more refined measure of similarity
than set-based metrics, as they also capture statistical relationships.
The last two metrics operate on data structures representing attack
events, such as a binary vector, e.g., ~Si = [si1 si2 · · · siN ], of all
possible IP addresses with 1-s if an IP attacked at least once and
0-s otherwise. This can make it difficult to compute correlation in
practice, as both parties need to agree on the range of IP addresses
under consideration to construct vector ~Si. Considering the entire
range of IP addresses is not reasonable (i.e., this would require a
vector of size 3.7 billion, one entry for each routable IP address).
Instead, parties could either agree on a range via 2PC or fetch pre-
defined ranges from a public repository.
In practice, entities could decide to compute any combination
of metrics. In fact, the choice of metrics could periodically be re-
Benefit Esti- Operation Private
mation Metric Protocol
Intersection- |Si ∩ Sj | PSI-CA [13]Size
Jaccard
|Si ∩ Sj |
|Si ∪ Sj |
PJS [5]
Pearson
∑N
l=1
(sil − µi)(sjl − µj)
Nσiσj
Garbled
Circuits [24]
Cosine
~Si ~Sj
‖ ~Si‖‖ ~Sj‖
Garbled
Circuits [24]
Table 1: Metrics for estimating potential benefits of data sharing between
Vi and Vj , along with corresponding protocols for their secure computation.
µi, µj and σi, σj denote, resp., mean and standard deviation of ~Si and ~Sj .
negotiated. Also, the list of metrics reported in Table 1 is non-
exhaustive and others could be considered, e.g., for problems and
datasets of different nature, as long as there exist a practical tech-
nique to securely evaluate them. Moreover, the benefits of collab-
oration might depend on other factors such as the amount and type
of data merged, as well as the reputation of other parties.
Establishing Partnerships. After assessing the potential benefits
of data sharing, entities make an informed decision as to whether
or not to collaborate. Possible decision strategies include:
1. Threshold-based: Vi and Vj partner up if the estimated ben-
efit of sharing is above a certain threshold;
2. Maximization: Vi and Vj independently enlist k potential
partners to maximize their overall benefits (i.e., k entities
with maximum expected benefits);
3. Hybrid: Vi and Vj enlist k potential partners to maximize
their overall benefits, but also partner with entities for which
estimated benefits are above a certain threshold.
In practice, entities might refuse to collaborate with other enti-
ties that do not generate enough benefits. One solution is to rely on
well-known collaboration algorithms that offer stability (e.g., Sta-
ble Marriage/Roommate Matching [20]). Without loss of general-
ity, we leave this for future work and assume cooperative parties:
entities systematically accept collaboration requests.
Symmetry of Benefits. Some of the protocols used for secure com-
putation of benefits, such as PSI-CA [13] and PJS [5], reveal the
output of the protocol to only one party. Without loss of generality,
we assume that this party always reports the output to its coun-
terpart. We operate in the semi-honest model, thus parties are as-
sumed not to prematurely abort protocols. Metrics discussed above
are symmetric, i.e., both parties obtain the same value, and facilitate
partner selection as both parties have incentive to select each other.
3.3 Merge
After the Select stage, entities are organized into coalitions, i.e.,
groups of victims that agreed to share data with each other. Entities
can now merge their datasets with selected partners.
Strategies. Partners could share their datasets in several ways: e.g.,
they can disclose their whole data or only share which IP addresses
they have in common, or transfer all attack events associated to
common addresses and/or a selection thereof.
Privacy-preserving Merging. Our goal is to ensure that nothing
about datasets is disclosed to partners beyond what is agreed. For
instance, if partners agree to only share information about attackers
Sharing Strategy Operation Private Protocol
Intersection Si ∩ Sj PSI [14]
Intersection with {〈IP,time,port〉| PSI with
Associated Data IP ∈ Si ∩ Sj} Data Transfer [14]
Union with {〈IP,time,port〉| – No Privacy –Associated Data IP ∈ Si ∪ Sj}
Table 2: Strategies for merging datasets among partners Vi and Vj , along
with corresponding protocols for their secure computation.
they have in common, they should not learn any other information.
Possible merging strategies, along with the corresponding privacy-
preserving protocols, are reported in Table 2. Again, we assume
that the output of the merging protocol is revealed to both parties.
Strategies denoted as Intersection/Union with Associated Data
mean that parties not only compute and share the intersection (resp.,
union), but also all events related to items in the resulting set. Ob-
viously, Union with Associated Data does not yield any privacy, as
all events are mutually shared.
Note that organizations could limit the information sharing in
time, e.g., by only disclosing data older than a month or of the last
week. Also, previously proposed sanitization techniques [1, 31, 37,
43] could be used on top of SIC’s merging strategies.
3.4 Properties
Privacy. Our approach guarantees privacy through limited infor-
mation sharing. Only data explicitly authorized by parties, and of
interest to other parties, is actually shared. Therefore, the threat
of information leakage is reduced. Data sharing occurs by means
of secure two-party computation techniques, thus, security follows,
provably, from that of underlying cryptographic primitives.
Authenticity. Recall that we assume semi-honest adversaries, i.e.,
entities do not alter their input datasets. If one relaxes this assump-
tion, then it would become possible for a malicious entity to inject
fake inputs or manipulate datasets to violate counterpart’s privacy.
Nonetheless, we argue that assuming honest-but-curious entities
is realistic in our model. First, organizations can establish long-
lasting relations and reduce the risk of malicious inputs as mis-
behaving entities will eventually get caught. Second, given SIC’s
peer-to-peer nature, one could also leverage peer-to-peer techniques
to detect malicious behavior [40].
Incentives and Competitiveness. Since data exchanges are bi-
directional, each party directly benefits from participation and can
quantify the contribution of its partners. If collaboration metrics
do not indicate high potential, each entity can deny collaboration.
In other words, the incentive to participate is immediate as benefits
can be quantified before establishing partnerships.
Trust. SIC relies on data to establish trust automatically, as pre-
viously explored by the peer-to-peer community [40]. If multiple
entities report similar data, then it is likely correct and contributors
can be considered as trustworthy. SIC enables entities to estimate
each others’ datasets and potential collaboration value. This added
transparency increases awareness of the contribution value and en-
ables automation of trust establishment.
Speed. Due to the lack of a central authority (or vetting processes),
collaboration and data sharing in SIC are instantaneous. Thus, it is
possible for entities to interact as often and as fast as they wish.
4. THE DSHIELD DATASET: OVERVIEW
AND KEY CHARACTERISTICS
In order to assess the effectiveness of our approach, we should
ideally obtain security data from real-world organizations. Such
datasets are hard to come by because of their sensitivity. There-
fore, we turn to DShield.org [42] and obtain a dataset of firewall
and IDS logs mostly contributed by individuals and small organi-
zations. DShield contains data contributors are willing to report,
however, as in previous work [44, 52], we can assume strong corre-
lation between the amount of reporting and the amount of attacks.
In this section, we show that DShield dataset contains data from
a large variety of contributors (in terms of amount of contribu-
tions) and provides a reasonable alternative to experiment with our
privacy-friendly collaborative approach.
4.1 The Dataset
We obtained two months’ worth of logs from the DShield repos-
itory. Each entry in the logs includes a Contributor ID, a source IP
address, a target port number, and a timestamp (see Table 3).
Contributor ID Source IP Target port Timestamp
44cc551a 211.144.119.042 1433 2013-01-01 11:48:36
Table 3: Example of an entry in the DShield dataset.
The source of an attack refers to the attacker and target (or con-
tributor) refers to a victim (Vi). Note that DShield anonymized the
“Contributor ID” field by replacing it with a random yet unique
string that maps to a single victim. Data obtained from DShield
consists of about 2 billion entries, from 800K unique contribu-
tors, including more than 16M malicious IP sources, for a total of
170GB. We pre-processed the dataset in order to reduce noise and
erroneous entries, following the same methodology adopted by pre-
vious work on DShield data [44, 52]. We removed approximately
1% of of all entries, which belonged to invalid, non-routable, or
unassigned IP addresses, or referred to non-existent port numbers
(e.g., > 65536).
4.2 Measurements & Observations
We present a measurement analysis of the DShield dataset, aim-
ing to better understand characteristics of attackers and victims.
Overall, our observations are in line with prior work [10, 38, 39,
44] and underline the trend towards attackers hitting victims in a
coordinated fashion, thus confirming the potential of collaboration
among victims.
General Statistics. Fig. ?? shows the CDF of the fraction of vic-
tims that contribute their logs to DShield over the course of two
months. We observe that about 75% of targets contribute less than
10% of the time, while about 6% of targets (50, 000 targets) con-
tribute daily. We describe at the end of this section how we filter
out targets that seldom contribute.
Fig. 2(a) presents the histogram of the number of attacks per
day, indicating about 30M daily attacks. We observe a significant
increase around day 50 to 100M attacks. Careful analysis reveals
that a series of IP addresses start to attack more aggressively around
day 50, indicating what might be the beginning of a DoS attack.
Fig. 2(b) shows the number of unique targets and sources over
time. A detailed analysis shows a relatively stable number of sources
and targets. This stability in number of attackers confirms that it
should be possible to predict attackers’ tactics based on past obser-
vations.
An analysis of attacked ports shows that top 10 attacked ports
(with more than 10M hits) are Telnet, HTTP, SSH, DNS, FTP, BGP,
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Figure 3: CDF of entropy of different attack parameters.
Active Directory, and Netbios ports. This shows a clear trend to-
wards misuse of popular web services.
Predictability. Fig. 3 shows the CDF of the Shannon entropy of the
different log entry elements. It helps us visualize the uncertainty
about a given IP address, port number or target appearing in the
logs, and thus estimate our ability to predict those values. To obtain
this figure, we estimate the probability of each victim, source or
port being attacked each day. For example, for each port i, we
compute:
Pr(Port i on day j) =
Attacks on Port i on day j
Attacks on day j
(1)
We also compute the entropy for each day and aggregate it overall
using the CDF. Previous work [45] showed that, following Fano’s
inequality, the entropy correlates with predictability. We observe
that ports numbers have the lower entropy distribution, indicating a
small set of targeted ports: 80% of attacks target a set of 27 = 128
ports, indicating high predictability. We also observe that victims
are more predictable than sources, as 90% of victims lie within a
set of 212 = 4096 victims as compared to 90% of sources being in
a list of 214 = 16, 384 sources. Victims’ set is thus significantly
smaller and more predictable than attackers’ set.
Intensity. Fig. 5(a) shows the inter-arrival time of attacks in hours,
and Fig. 5(b) shows the inter-arrival time of attacks in seconds. We
observe that almost all attacks occur within 3-minute windows. IP
addresses and /24 subnetworks have similar behavior. In particular,
Fig. 5(b) shows that in short time intervals, 85% of /8 subnetworks
have short attack inter-arrival time indicating the bursty attacks on
such networks. Attackers target subnetworks for short time and
then disappear.
Victims’ Profile. Fig. 4(a) shows the number of attacks per day
on targets, with mean number of daily attacks on targets of 58.46
and median of 1. We observe three distinct victims’ profiles: (1)
rarely attacked victims: 87% of targets get less than 10 attacks
day, indicating many victims seldom attacked; (2) lightly attacked
victims: 11% of victims get 10 to 100 attacks a day; (3) heavily
attacked victims: only 2% of targets are under high attack (peaking
at 11M a day). In other words, most attacks target few victims.
Attackers’ Profile. Fig. 4(b) shows the number of victims at-
tacked by each source per day, with mean number of daily attacks
of 45.85 and median of 2. We observe that 80% of sources initiate
less than 10 attacks a day, indicating most sources are stealth. A
small number of sources generates most attacks (up to 10M daily).
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Figure 2: General DShield characteristics: (a) Histogram of number of attacks per day. (b) Number of unique targets and sources.
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Figure 4: Number of attacks per day: (a) on all targets, and (b) by all sources. CDF of the daily number of common and unique: (c) sources per active victims,
and (d) victims per active sources. Active refers to the fact that we ignore victims/sources that do not contribute attacks on that specific day to avoid strong
bias towards 0.
This broadly indicates two main categories of attackers: stealth and
heavy hitters. In our data set, we observe that several of top heavy
attackers (more than 20M attacks) come from IP addresses owned
by ISPs in the UK.
Attacks’ Characteristics. Fig. 4(c) shows the CDF of the number
of unique sources seen by each active target a day. We focus on
active victims: victims that did report an event on that particular
day because, as previously discussed, many victims report attacks
rarely thus creating a strong bias towards 0 otherwise. The figure
contains attackers shared with other targets (common attackers) and
attackers unique to a specific victim. 90% of victims are attacked
by 40 unique sources and 60 shared sources. This shows that, from
the victim’s perspective, targets observe more shared sources than
unique ones. Compared to previous work [44, 27], this reinforces
the past trend of targets having many common attackers.
Fig. 4(d) shows that 90% of sources attack 30 common victims
and 60 unique victims. Although attackers share a large number of
common victims, they also uniquely attack specific victims. Note
that in Fig. 4(c) and Fig. 4(d), we observe again three types of vic-
tims and two types of attackers.
Observations. A significant proportion of victims (70% in Fig. 4(a))
contributes a single event overall. After thorough investigation, we
find that these one-time contributors can be grouped into clusters
all reporting the same IP address within close time intervals (often
within one second). In other words, many contributors share only
one attack event, at the same time, about the same potentially mali-
cious IP address. Similarly, many contributors only contribute one
day out of the two months (Fig. ??). We find that these contributors
correlate with the aforementioned one-time contributors.
We remove victims that do not share much. In particular, we
remove victims that (1) share one event overall, and (2) contribute
only one day and less than less than 20 events over the two month
(i.e., 10% of mean total contributions per victim 2,263). This data
processing maintains properties identified in this section and re-
duces the number of considered victims from 800,000 to 188,522,
corresponding to the removal of about 2M attacks. This filtering
maintains a high diversity of contributors, and seeks to model real-
world scenarios (as opposed to focusing on large contributors).
5. PRIVACY-PRESERVING COLLABORA-
TIVE PREDICTIVE BLACKLISTING
We present an experimental evaluation of the SIC framework fo-
cused on (1) investigating which select metrics work best to es-
timate the benefits of sharing (measured as the resulting improve-
ment in prediction accuracy), and (2) measuring what merging stra-
tegies (i.e., what data to share) provide the best privacy/accuracy
trade-off. To do so, we use the DShield dataset built in Sec. 4. Ex-
periments involve 188,522 contributing entities, each reporting an
average of 2,000 attacks, for a total of 2 billion attacks.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Experiments are implemented in R. Source code will be released
along with the final version of the paper and can already be ob-
tained, anonymously, via the PC chairs.
General Parameters. For the prediction algorithm, we use a one-
week window for training (Ttrain = 7) and aim to predict attacks
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Figure 5: CDF of inter-arrival time of attacks: (a) per hour, and (b) per second. All indicates the inter-arrival time of any attacks, /8 of common /8
subnetworks, /24 of common /24 subnetworks, and IP of the same IP.
for the next day (Ttest = 1). We run the SIC framework at each
time step. As previously discussed, organizations do not run SIC
with all possible other organizations, but focus on a few potential
partners. To model this, we take a sampling approach: For each it-
eration, we select 100 victims at random from the set of all 188,522
possible victims and run our select/merge algorithms. We average
our results over 100 iterations.
Select Algorithms. We analyze how well different collaboration
metrics (i.e., select strategies) perform in comparison to each other,
where performance is measured in terms of resulting improvement
in prediction accuracy.
SIC supports both set-based (Intersection-Size and Jaccard) and
correlation-based (Pearson and Cosine) metrics. With the former,
the input of each entity Vi is a set of unique attacking IP addresses
Si. Intersection-Size returns the number of IP addresses attacking
both parties, while Jaccard is the ratio between the size of set in-
tersection and the size of the union. By contrast, for correlation
to work between two entities Vi and Vj , they need to agree on the
range of IPs captured in ~Si and ~Sj . We assume that both parties
know the global list of suspicious IP addresses. In practice, par-
ties can agree on the range via secure computation or fetch known
malicious IP address lists from repositories such as DShield.
Metrics are computed pairwise across entities. As a consequence,
we obtain a matrix estimating data sharing benefits among all pos-
sible pairs. We assume that parties select partners by maximizing
their potential benefits in the collaboration matrix. Typically, each
party picks the list of partners with the largest potential benefits.
W.l.o.g. we consider that the 50 largest collaboration pairs are se-
lected (i.e., only 1% of 100 ∗ 99/2 = 4 950 possible pairs as we
consider 100 victims). Such a small number provides a high degree
of privacy and takes a conservative stance by limiting the possible
improvement in the prediction accuracy. Recall that the goal of our
experimental evaluation is to understand which metrics work better,
not to establish the optimal size of collaboration pools.
Merge Algorithms. We consider two types of algorithms, Union
with Associated Data and Intersection with Associated Data (see
Sec. 3.3). With the former, partners share all data known by each
party prior to current time t and share it with each selected partner.
It is a generous strategy that enriches others’ datasets rapidly. With
the latter, partners only share events from those IP addresses that
belong to the intersection (i.e., that attacked both partners) and thus
is a more conservative option. This approach can help reinforce
knowledge about given adversaries, and thus help better predict at-
tacks.
Accuracy. As discussed in Sec. 2.3, we measure the prediction suc-
cess by computing the number of True Positives (TP), as in prior
work [44, 52]. True positives correspond to successfully predicted
attacks. Specifically, we measure the Improvement I as the follow-
ing fraction:
I =
TPc − TP
TP
(2)
where TP is the number of True Positives before collaboration and
TPc is the number of True Positives after collaboration. We note
that improvement can be measured over all entities, or for specific
entities. In the following, we give both improvement measures.
5.2 Results
Determining the Value of α. Before testing the performance of
select/merge algorithms, we need to identify appropriate α values
for the EWMA prediction algorithm by evaluating the performance
of the prediction. For small values of α, the prediction algorithm
aggregates past information uniformly across the training window
to craft predictions. In other words, events in the far past have a
similar weight to events in the short past and the algorithm has a
long memory. On the contrary, with a large α, the prediction algo-
rithm focuses on the most recent past events; it has short memory.
Fig. 6(a) shows the evolution of the baseline prediction for dif-
ferent values of α, plotting the True Positives (TP) sum of all 100
victims averaged over 100 iterations. Values between α = 0.5 and
α = 0.9 perform best. This can be explained by remembering the
“bursty nature” of web attacks, as discussed in Sec. 4. Prediction
algorithms that react fast to the apparition of new attackers perform
better. In the following experiments, we set α = 0.9.
Visualizing Predictions. Fig. 6(b) shows a visualization of the
prediction. When an attack occurs (blue square), the algorithm
systematically predicts an attack (red cross) in the next time slot.
Because α = 0.9, the last attack event has a larger weight.
Baseline Prediction. We verify the effectiveness of the prediction
algorithm by correlating the information known by targets prior to
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Figure 6: Evaluation of baseline prediction (with no collaboration). (a) Number of true positives for different values of prediction algorithm parameter α. (b)
Visualization of a victim’s predictions over time for a series of attackers with α = 0.9 on y-axis.
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Figure 7: Prediction Analysis. (a) Correlation between number of events known by targets, and their ability to predict attacks. The blue curve shows the
linear regression (note the log-log scale). (b) Average sum of True Positives over time for different select methods. (c) Average sum of True Positives over
time among collaborators selected by Intersection-Size including upper bounds (LUB and GUB).
collaboration with their ability to predict future attacks. We obtain
that, as expected, targets that know more about past attacks (large
Si), successfully predict more future attacks. We compute the cor-
relation R and obtain R > 0.9 on average, which indicates strong
correlation. This, once again, suggests that collaboration increases
prediction success. We visualize this correlation for a specific sim-
ulation in Fig. 7(a).
5.2.1 Select Strategies
Fig. 7(b) shows the accuracy of predictions for different select
methods over the course of one week, fixing the merge algorithm
to Intersection with Associated Data, as it provides the strongest
privacy protection. We sum the total number of TP for “collab-
orators” (i.e., entities that do share data) and “non-collaborators”
(entities that do not share data, thus performing as in the baseline).
We observe that Intersection-Size performs best, followed by Jac-
card, and Cosine/Pearson. The overall decrease in sum of True
Positives after day 10 is due to the decrease of attacks on those
days (Fig. 2(a)).
Improvement Over Baseline. In Fig. 7(c), we compare the pre-
diction accuracy of upper-bounds, baseline, and collaboration us-
ing Intersection-Size as the select metric and merging data using
Intersection with Associated Data. We sum the total number of TP
for collaborators selected by the Intersection-Size metric.
Remind that with the Global Upper Bound (GUB), every victim
shares with every other victim and predicts perfectly. With the Lo-
cal Upper Bound (LUB), organizations do not share anything but
still predict perfectly.
The accuracy of Intersection-Size predictions tends to match LUB,
showing that collaboration helps perform as well as a local perfect
predictor. Note that prediction performance can be significantly
improved (thus, reducing the “gap” with GUB) by enabling more
collaboration pairs than the conservative 50 (1% of all pairs) con-
sidered in our experiments.
Effects of Selective Collaboration. Table 4 summarizes predic-
tion improvements for collaborators given different select metrics,
reporting the mean, max, and min improvement, as well as number
of collaborators. Correlation-based metrics provide a less signif-
icant prediction improvement than set-based metrics. Mean I for
Pearson and Cosine is about 40%. Notably, the Intersection-Size
has a 105% mean improvement. Also, mean I for Jaccard is about
60%. Naturally, the improvement can also be measured for each
entity: I for Intersection-Size is up to 700%.
Differences between select metrics are due to several reasons.
First, metrics that use a normalization factor (i.e., all but Intersection-
Size) tend to create partnerships of small collaborators. By contrast,
Intersection-Size leads to better performance because it promotes
collaboration with larger victims. To confirm this hypothesis, we
measure the set size of collaborators according to different metrics
(Fig. 8) and confirm that metrics with a normalization factor tend
Select Metric Improvement Collaborators CoalitionsMean Max Min Mean SD Mean SD Median
Intersection-Size 1.05 7 0 19.47 2.24 5.09 4.09 4
Jaccard 0.58 8 0 30.17 4.44 3.16 2.74 2
Pearson 0.37 8 0 18.08 1.40 5.20 3.15 5
Cosine 0.39 8 0 17.98 1.29 5.26 3.14 5
Table 4: Fraction of Prediction Improvements I for Collaborators, number of collaborators, and size of coalitions. For Improvement, Mean denotes the
average improvement over all collaborators, Max the largest improvement, and Min the smallest improvement. For Collaborators, Mean gives the average
number of entities that collaborate overall (out of 100). For Coalitions, Mean gives the average number of collaborators per entity.
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Figure 8: Boxplot of number of events known by collaborators given dif-
ferent select metrics. The bottom and top of the box correspond to first and
third quartiles. The band inside the box is the second quartile (the median).
Outliers are shows with small circles.
to pick collaborators that know less.
Second, correlation-based metrics tend to select partners that are
too similar: maximum correlation values are close to 1, whereas
maximum Jaccard values get to 0.5 only. Although this implies
that targets learn to better defend against specific adversaries, it
also leads to little acquired knowledge.
Third, depending on the select metric, at each time step, victims
may partner with previous collaborators, or with new ones. We find
that Intersection-Size, Pearson, and Cosine lead to stable groups of
collaborators with about 90% reuse over time, whereas Jaccard has
larger diversity of collaborators over time. This is because about
20% of victims have high Jaccard similarity versus only 4% for
correlation-based metrics providing a larger pool of potential col-
laborators. Hence, if Intersection-Size helps a few learn a lot, Jac-
card helps many victims over time.
Statistical Analysis. We take a closer look at Fig. 8. A t-test anal-
ysis shows that the mean of the number of events known by collab-
orators differs significantly (p < 0.0005) across all pairs of select
metrics but Cosine and Pearson.
Furthermore, if one categorizes collaborators as “large” if they
know more than 500 events, and “small” otherwise, and consider
Cosine and Pearson as one (given the t-test result), we obtain a
3 × 2 table of select metrics and size categories. A χ2-test on
the table shows that categorization differences are statistically sig-
nificant: Intersection-Size tends to select larger collaborators, but
also more collaborators than Pearson/Cosine (see Table 4). Other
metrics tend to select small collaborators. We obtain χ2(2, N =
448) = 191.99, p < 0.0005, where 2 is the degrees of freedom of
the χ2 estimate, and N is the total number of observations.
Coalitions. Recall that, at each time step, entities can decide to
partner with a number of other entities. Table 4 shows the mean,
standard deviation, and median number of collaborators per party
for different collaboration metrics. We observe that with Jaccard,
entities tend to select less collaborators. Other metrics tend to have
similar behavior and have entities to collaborate with about 5 other
entities out of 100. This is in line with previous work [27], which
showed the existence of small groups of correlated entities.
We also observe that, after a few days (usually 2), Intersection-
Size, Pearson, and Cosine converge to a relatively stable group of
collaborators. From one time-step to another, parties continue to
collaborate with about 90% of entities they previously collaborated.
In other words, coalitions are relatively stable over time. Compar-
atively, Jaccard has a larger diversity of collaborators over time.
5.2.2 Merge Algorithms
The next step is to compare the average prediction improvement
I for different merge algorithms. As showed in Fig. 9, Intersection
with Associated Data performs almost as good as Union with As-
sociated Data with all select strategies. Actually, it performs better
with Jaccard. Merging using the union entails sharing more infor-
mation, thus, one would expect it to always perform better.
However, using Union with Associated Data, we notice that or-
ganizations quickly converge to a stable set of collaborators, and
obtain a potentially lower diversity of insights over time. With most
metrics, the set of collaborators is stable over time anyways, and so
union does perform better than intersection. But, as previously dis-
cussed, Jaccard tends to yield a larger diversity of collaborators
over time and thus benefits more from Intersection with Associated
Data as it re-enforces such diversity of insights.
5.3 Performance
We now estimate the operational cost of our techniques and show
that it is appreciably low, thus demonstrating the viability of our
approach in the real-world. Specifically, we evaluate the over-
head introduced by the privacy protection layer, i.e., the privacy-
preserving information sharing protocols used to securely execute
the select/merge algorithms.
Excluding correlation-based metrics (due to lower accuracy im-
provement), the protocols for privately selecting partners (Intersection-
Size and Jaccard) can be realized based on Private Set Intersection
Cardinality (PSI-CA), and we choose the instantiation proposed in
[13], which incur computation and communication overhead linear
in sets size. Privacy-preserving merging is realized using the Pri-
vate Set Intersection (PSI) with Data Transfer protocol from [14]
in order to realize Intersection with Associated Data.
We implemented protocols from [13] and [14] in C, using GMP
and OpenSSL cryptographic libraries, and conducted experiments
on two Intel Xeon desktops with 3.10GHz CPU, connected by a
100 Mbps Ethernet link. Fig. 4(c) shows that 98% of targets are
attacked by approximately 200 sources. Using sets of size 200,
we find that it takes approximately 400ms to run the PSI protocol
in [14] and 550ms to run PSI-CA in [13]. Assuming that n or-
ganizations contribute to our framework, we have a total of n − 1
interactions per entity, and a total of (n−1)n
2
pairwise executions.
Naturally, it is not reasonable to consider all possible partner-
ships in a large pool of organizations. Parties first identify a set
of potential partners, such as organizations within an industry, and
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Figure 9: Number of True Positives (TP) for two different merge algo-
rithms: Union/Intersection with Associated Data.
then select the best partners within. Realistically, we can thus as-
sume n = 100. We obtain that the running time amounts to 54s for
one entity to estimate benefits, using PSI-CA, with all other (99)
parties. Following a conservative stance, i.e., assuming that entities
select and share with all possible 99 partners, privacy-preserving
merging via PSI-DT takes 40s (in the worst case scenario).
Pairwise executions can obviously be performed in parallel, at
least, between different pairs. Even if we assumed a worst-case
scenario, where data sharing occur in a sequential manner across
all organizations, the total computation overhead (again, assuming
n = 100 partners and merging with all partners) would amount
to 45 minutes for benefit estimation and 33 minutes for dataset
merging, which is still reasonable for computations that are per-
formed, e.g., once a day. Also considering that more efficient proto-
cols for privacy-preserving information sharing are being proposed,
e.g., [16], we conclude that overhead introduced by the privacy pro-
tection layer is appreciably low and does not impede the deploy-
ment and the adoption of our techniques.
5.4 Summary of Results
Knowing More Means Predicting More. Our experiments show
that targets that know more tend to successfully predict more at-
tacks. This confirms our hypothesis about the opportunity to col-
laborate with targets exposed to numerous attacks. However, the
simple “more-data-the-better” approach conflicts with the basic pri-
vacy principle of data minimization. Thus, the challenge consists
in identifying partners that help most. Choosing partners based on
higher values of Intersection-Size (i.e., number of common attacks)
works best and provides convenient privacy properties since it only
discloses information about attackers entities already know of.
Sometimes Sharing Does Not Help Much. In some cases, data
sharing does not yield significant improvements. Our analysis re-
veals that differences in the definition of similarity can lead to
significant variations in prediction accuracy. We find that, when
considering correlation-based similarity between victims’ profiles,
small contributors are paired together, leading to small overall im-
provements. By contrast, set-based metrics favor larger contribu-
tors and thus yield larger overall improvement.
Sharing Only Common Attacks Is Almost As Useful As Sharing
Everything. When merging datasets, organizations sharing only
information about common attacks (i.e., using Intersection with As-
sociated Data) achieve a good trade-off between privacy and utility
as the improvement is almost as good as when sharing everything.
Intuitively, merging using intersection helps because it reinforces
knowledge of a particular attacker, while using union helps victims
attacked by varying group of attackers. Hence, we find that vic-
tims benefit as much from improving their knowledge of current
attackers, as learning about sources that attack them next. In other
words, learning information about attackers that targeted a victim
in the past is similar to learning about attackers that might target a
victim in the future.
5.5 Limitations
The DShield dataset used in our experiments is biased toward
small organizations voluntarily reporting data, thus it might not be
directly evident how to generalize our results. However, our find-
ings show strong statistical evidence that collaboration metrics af-
fect data sharing performance in interesting ways. Our proposed
algorithms and methodology can serve as the basis for further ex-
periments that explore the concept of privacy-friendly data sharing.
As in previous work [44, 52], we did not consider false posi-
tives and focused on measuring the prediction algorithm’s TP. As
discussed in Sec. 2.3, this is reasonable as the prediction algorithm
identifies suspicious IP addresses that deserve further scrutiny and
that are subsequently processed by blacklisting algorithms, which
actually block sources, even though false positives might increase
the computational load and complexity of the blacklisting algo-
rithm by providing larger inputs.
Finally, note that this paper does not aim to present a finished
product, but to demonstrate the viability and effectiveness of privacy-
enhancing technologies on collaborative threat mitigation. While
the overhead introduced by our peer-to-peer approach is still non-
negligible, it is significantly lower than existing alternatives such as
FHE. Also, a few improvements could be explored in future work
to improve performance, including parallelization, centralization,
and/or sampling.
6. RELATED WORK
6.1 Collaborative Security Initiatives
Public Sector. In 1998, U.S. President Clinton initiated a national
program on Critical Infrastructure Protection [7], which promoted
collaboration between government and private sector, and created
the Financial Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-
ISAC). In 2003, this was extended to virtual systems and IT in-
frastructures with the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7
(HSPD-7), and recently reinforced [35]. In 2013, the US House of
Representatives passed the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protec-
tion Act (CISPA), which met huge opposition as it granted broad
immunity to data sharing entities, and took generous views on what
data could be shared and with whom. The bill was not voted on
by the Senate and the debate is still ongoing with similar propos-
als [48]. Standardization bodies also push collaborative frame-
works and established appropriate data formats (IDMEF, IODEF
RFC 5070 [12]), collaboration protocols (the Real-time Inter-network
Defense RFC 6545 [33]), and guidelines (ISO 27010, ITU-T SG17).
Private Sector. The RedSky Alliance [41] helps security profes-
sionals share intelligence after a vetting process for trust establish-
ment. Another example is TF-CSIRT (Task Force of Computer
Security Incident Response Teams) [46], which improves coordi-
nation among European Community Emergency Response Teams
(CERTs). Besides DShield [42], other community-based initiatives
focus on sharing and correlating security data. DOMINO (Dis-
tributed Overlay for Monitoring InterNet Outbreaks) [51] provides
distributed intrusion detection promoting collaboration among nodes.
In Europe, the Worldwide Observatory of Malicious Behaviors and
Attack Threats (WOMBAT) gathers security related data in real-
time. Symantec also introduced a data sharing platform, WINE. Fi-
nally, the MITRE Corporation [32] developed file formats (STIX),
collaboration protocols (TAXII), and repository formats (CAPEC,
MAEC) for structure threat information exchange.
Barriers to Adoption. These initiatives have had little success, as
pointed out by the Federal Communications Commission’s Work-
ing Group on Communications Security, Reliability and Interoper-
ability Council’s (CSRIC) [9]. Existing solutions rely on manual
out-of-band channels to establish trust. For instance, the RedSky
alliance relies on a long and costly vetting process that requires
manual labor to verify the trustworthiness of potential partners.
Furthermore, organizations need to reveal their datasets to a cen-
tralized third-party and rely on it to for security. Thus, they have
limited control over how their data is shared with other participants.
Existing solutions have a turnover of a few days for RedSky al-
liance, to a few weeks in the case of ISACs. In other words, the
feedback is significantly slower than the spread of malware. It is
difficult for companies to quantify how much others are contribut-
ing, and this lack of transparency discourages contributions. By
contrast, our solutions offer privacy-preserving benefit measures to
provide immediate feedback, real-time turnover, and transparency
of contributions.
6.2 Collaborative Threat Mitigation
Previous research work [27, 44, 38, 52] has relied on central
repositories for collaborative threat mitigation without providing
privacy protection. Katti et al. [27] showed that correlated attacks,
i.e., attacks mounted by same IP sources against different victims,
are prevalent on the Internet. Pouget at al. [38] obtained similar
results using distributed honeypots for observation of malicious
online activities. Katti et al. further clustered victims that share
common attacks and found that (1) correlations among victims are
persistent over time; and (2) collaboration among victims from cor-
related attacks dramatically improves malicious IP detection time.
This contrasts with our results and shows that similarity metrics
must be carefully defined for data sharing to improve prediction.
Zhang et al. [52] introduced the concept of predictive black-
listing and suggested that victims should predict future attackers
based on their logs and those of other similar victims. Soldo et
al. [44] aim to forecast attack sources based on past, shared at-
tack logs using an implicit recommendation system (as opposed to
link-analysis in [52]) and improved prediction accuracy as well as
robustness against poisoning attacks.
6.3 Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing
The security research community has attempted to balance data
utility with privacy protection for data sharing via anonymization.
Lincoln et al. [31] suggested sharing sanitized security data for col-
laborative analysis of security threats. Specifically, they removed
sensitive data prior to sharing, such as IP addresses. Other mech-
anisms were proposed to anonymize traces, ranging from prefix-
preserving anonymization of IP addresses [43, 49] to statistical ob-
fuscation [1]. However, previous work showed that inference at-
tacks can de-anonymize network traces [8], and that it is difficult
to maintain data utility [28, 30, 34, 47]. Our work complements
anonymized data sharing efforts since in the merge phase, parties
could decide to share data sanitized according to existing proposals.
Alternatively, Applebaum et al. [3] presented protocols for pri-
vate data aggregation, and envisioned, as a use case, the analysis of
aggregated data for anomaly detection. Their approach requires a
semi-trusted proxy aggregator and only provides participants with
aggregated counts of common data points across multiple entities.
Burkhart et al. [6] proposed a distributed solution based on se-
cure multi-party computation and secret sharing that supports ag-
gregation of security alerts and traffic measurements among peers,
e.g., to estimate global traffic volume. These protocols are secure
as long as the majority of peers do not collude, assume a reliable in-
frastructure to distribute and store the key shares, and incur a large
number of rounds and communication overhead.
Aggregation helps detect malicious attacks or compute traffic
statistics but, alas, it operates similar to large alert repositories: it
identifies most prolific attack sources and yields global models. As
shown in [44, 52], generic attack models miss a significant number
of attacks, especially when attackers choose targets more strategi-
cally, focusing on a few known vulnerable networks.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a novel privacy-friendly approach to collab-
orative threat mitigation. We showed how organizations can quan-
tify expected benefits in a privacy-preserving way (i.e., without dis-
closing their datasets) before deciding whether or not to collabo-
rate. Based on these benefits, they can then organize into coalitions
and decide what/how much to share. We focused on collaborative
predictive blacklisting, evaluated our techniques on a real-world
dataset, and observed a significant improvement in prediction ac-
curacy (up to 105%, even when only 1% of all possible partners
collaborate).
Our first-of-its-kind analysis shows that certain collaboration stra-
tegies work better than others. The number of common attacks pro-
vides a good estimation of the benefits of sharing, as it drives en-
tities to partner with more knowledgable collaborators. Also, shar-
ing information only about common attacks proves to be almost as
useful as sharing everything. This suggests that victims benefit as
much from improving their knowledge about entities that currently
attack them, as from learning about entities that do not attack them
now, but might in the future.
We demonstrated the benefits of privacy-preserving information
sharing on collaborative threat mitigation and established that data
sharing does not have to be an “all-or-nothing” process: by relying
on efficient secure computation, it is possible to only share relevant
data, and only when beneficial. Privately assessing whether or not,
and how, entities should partner up prompts interesting challenges,
which our work is the first to tackle.
Finally, we hope that these insights can inform the ongoing de-
bates in the US Congress regarding the Cyber Intelligence Sharing
and Protection Act (CISPA) [48]. As part of future work, we intend
to study other metrics for partner selection (e.g., dissimilarity) and
experiment with other prediction algorithms and incentive mecha-
nisms. We will also explore how to adapt our approach to other
collaborative security problems, e.g., spam filtering [11], virus de-
tection [21], or DDoS mitigation [36].
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